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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 37 NOVEMBER 1984 NUMBER 6
COMMENTARY
The Insider Trading Sanctions




The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 is, on its face, a
simple piece of legislation. At the urging of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), Congress added section 21(d)(2) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934' to give the SEC the authority to
*Associate Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1976,
Harvard University; B.A. 1973, University of Virginia.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)
(Supp. 1984)). This penalty provision was the principal reason for the legislation, and far
and away its most significant feature. The 1984 Act also makes some changes to other en-
forcement related portions of the securities laws, §§ 3(a)(39), 15(b)(4), and 15(c)(4) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(39), 78o(b)(4), 78o(c)(4) (1982), and increases the
criminal fine for securities law violations. These changes-described at 130 CONG. REc.
H7758-59 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) - are beyond the scope of this Commentary. For practi-
cal discussions of the Act, see Stevenson, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act: Some Unfin-
ished Business Ahead, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 15, 1984, at 18, col. 1; Levine, Insider Trading Act
Broadens Enforcement Scope, Leg. Times of Wash., Sept. 10, 1984, at 17, col. 1. For a
preenactment overview, see Lynch, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act: New Remedies for
the SEC, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 166 (1984).
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seek civil penalties against persons who violate the prohibition
against "insider trading"2 of up to three times the profits made or
losses avoided by the trader.
But this recent legislation means much more than the addition
of a new form of remedy. True, the legislative history makes quite
clear that Congress did not intend the new law to address, in any
direct fashion, the substantive elements of a violation of rule 10b-5
as it applies to insider trading.3 A familiar canon of statutory con-
struction, however, is that when a statute fails to change the pre-
vailing judicial construction of some prior enacted provision, that
failure constitutes an implied endorsement of judicial interpreta-
tion, at least to the extent that Congress was aware of the con-
struction and there was a natural opportunity for revision.4 That
maxim applies to the 1984 Act, a fortiori. Congress hardly could be
expected to enhance so considerably the enforcement capacity of
the SEC when it was dissatisfied with the substantive grounds on
which the Commission could bring its actions. Indeed, the legisla-
tive history shows that the drafters demonstrated a substantial fa-
miliarity with the prevailing law, actively considered addressing
that law, but determined not to do so.
In two recent cases, Chiarella v. United States5 and Dirks v.
SEC,6 the Supreme Court imposed a confining doctrinal structure
on the prevailing law of insider trading-a structure that can be
justified, if at all, as a way of promoting greater orderliness in this
subject area.7 The most interesting aspect of the new legislation is
that while the drafters formally accepted this restrictive approach,
at the same time they strongly expressed an intention that the le-
gal doctrine of insider trading restrictions be inventive and result
2. "Insider trading" is used in this Commentary as a shorthand for any activity that
violates an antifraud prohibition against trading while the offender is in possession of mate-
rial nonpublic information. This prohibition thus may include liability for violators who are
in no sense "insiders" of the company whose shares are being traded. See infra text accom-
panying notes 70-76.
3. 130 CONG. REc. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984).
4. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1983); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1841 (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978); see also 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
49.09 (4th ed. 1973); Agusti, The Effect of Prior Judicial and Administrative Constructions
on Codification of Pre-Existing Federal Statutes: The Case of the Federal Securities Code,
15 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 367 (1978).
5. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
6. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
7. See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Re-
statement, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 17 n.68 (1982).
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oriented-flexible enough to reach a wide range of abuses. This
legislative schizophrenia will, no doubt, further complicate and
convolute the evolution of insider trading theory. This Commen-
tary will consider the new remedy and the effect of its adoption.
II. THE SECTION 21(d)(2) REMEDY
A. Background
In recent years, insider trading enforcement has become the
most visible of the SEC's programmatic efforts-achieving a level
of emphasis in the present SEC similar to that of pursuit of foreign
bribery, corporate slushfunds, and dishonest management in the
mid and late 1970's. Notwithstanding an increasing level of aca-
demic controversy over the very propriety of insider trading
prohibitions,8 aggressive enforcement in this area has had biparti-
san political support within the SEC,9 and as the new Act illus-
trates, bipartisan support in Congress as well. Economic theory has
fallen to the simple reality that a crusade for "fair play" in the
marketplace has undeniable political appeal.
How best to deter insider trading, however, has been a prob-
lem. Until recently, criminal prosecutions were relatively
rare-there was no comparable enforcement commitment at the
Department of Justice. SEC civil actions were common, but courts
effectively limited relief to disgorgement of profits and an injunc-
tion against future violations. In light of the difficulty of catching
insiders who trade in the first place, these SEC civil actions were
not seen as an effective deterrent.'0 The only other form of deter-
rence was the class action based private remedies for damages-an
uncertain mechanism in any event. Class actions did, at least, pro-
vide an in terrorem possibility for a period following the Second
Circuit's decision in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
8. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Carlton &
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Dooley, Enforce-
ment of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Wang, Trading on Material
Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981).
9. Some people feared that with the advent of the Reagan Administration, the SEC
would retreat from its policy of aggressive securities law enforcement. To some extent, the
Commission used the insider trading program as a vehicle for dispelling this general notion.
The SEC has denied that it has overemphasized insider trading enforcement. See 15 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 567 (Mar. 18, 1983).
10. For an expression of judicial frustration with the inadequacy of this remedy, see
SEC v. Randolph, 564 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 91,576 (9th Cir. June 29, 1984).
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Smith, Inc.," apparently giving standing to sue for injury suffered
by virtue of nondisclosure to everyone in the marketplace who sold
between the time the insider bought (or bought, if the insider sold)
and the time of disclosure of the relevant information. That hold-
ing raised the possibility of damages awards far in excess of the
defendant's gains.
Two events in 1979 and 1980 focused the SEC's attention on
the need for a superior enforcement mechanism. One was the
SEC's deliberations over the American Law Institute's proposed
Federal Securities Code. The drafters of the Code had retained the
Shapiro approach regarding standing, but had limited class recov-
ery, effectively, to the amount of profits made or losses avoided by
the trader-eliminating the in terrorem effect. 2 Altering the dam-
ages provision was a high priority of the SEC staff in discussions
with the drafters concerning possible SEC support for the Code;
the staff proposed a "multiple of disgorgement"-three times the
profits realized by the inside trader-as a preferable approach.
Notwithstanding objections that such a measure would be purely
punitive and out of sync with the Code's generally compensatory
approach to damages, the staff and drafters compromised on a pro-
posal that gave courts discretion to award the plaintiff class 150%
of profits realized or losses avoided.' 3 In September 1980 the SEC
endorsed the Code, subject to this altered damage provision and a
number of other changes.' 4 The other event, also in 1980, was the
Second Circuit's decision in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 5
which essentially followed the original Code approach of simple
disgorgement, and incorporated it into the current law. The SEC
petitioned for rehearing, raising the same concerns about deter-
rence that it had raised with the Code's drafters and suggesting a
similar type of remedy. The Second Circuit denied rehearing, and
the in terrorem effect was, for the present, gone.
Thus, by the end of 1980, the SEC had both focused on the
11. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). But see Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (damages not recoverable absent showing of actual
injury to class members).
12. FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1603, 1708(b)(2)(B) (1980).
13. FED. SEC. CODE § 1708(b)(4) (Supp. 1981).
14. See Rel. No. 33-6242, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 82,655
(Sept. 18, 1980).
15. 635 F.2d 156, 168-73 (2d Cir. 1980), discussed in Recent Development, Damages
for Insider Trading in the Open Market: A New Limitation on Recovery Under Rule 10b-5,
34 VAND. L. REV. 797 (1981); see also Wilson v. Comtech Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 95
(2d Cir. 1981) (class limited to "contemporaneous" traders).
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lack of deterrence problem and developed a proposed solution.
With the step-up in efforts against insider trading leading to
greater public attention-later followed by a substantial increase
in political interest when two Reagan Administration officials be-
came the subjects of insider trading allegations' 6-the SEC sensed
the opportunity to seek congressional enhancement of its powers
and the new form of deterrence.
In September 1982 the SEC submitted a draft legislative pro-
posal that would allow it to seek up to three times profits made or
losses avoided as a civil penalty, and would increase the maximum
criminal penalty for all securities law violations from $10,000 to
$100,000.17 The House of Representatives held committee hearings
in April 1983 on the resulting bill, H.R. 559.18 The House passed
the bill, without objection, on September 19, 1983.19 The Senate
acted more slowly. Senator D'Amato of New York, the chairman of
the Senate securities subcommittee, wished to address a number of
additional issues, including the definition of insider trading. He
held hearings in April 1984, with most of the discussion directed at
how to define the prohibited act. ° On June 29, 1984, the Senate
discharged the committee from further consideration of H.R. 559.
The text of a companion bill, S. 910, which incorporated most of
the substance of the House bill but added some important new
items, became the operative proposal that the Senate then passed
by voice vote.21 On July 25 the House accepted all of the Senate
amendments, eliminating the need for a joint conference.2 2 Not-
16. The officials charged with violations were former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Thayer and former White House national security adviser Thomas C. Reed. Their cases are
discussed in 130 CONG. REc. H7757-58 (daily ed. July 25, 1984). The Reed matter received
intense Congressional scrutiny. See The SEC's Investigation of Thomas Reed: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Securities, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
17. Letter from SEC Chairman John Shad to Hon. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., with ac-
companying memorandum (Sept. 27, 1982), reprinted in H. R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 19-27 [hereinafter cited as SEC Proposal].
18. Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearing on H.R.
559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. The House Committee on
Energy and Commerce reported on the bill in H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) [hereainfter cited as HousE RFPORT].
19. See Bill to Allow Treble Damagtes for Insider Trading Passes House, 15 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1773 (Sept. 23, 1983).
20. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 559 Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
21. See Senate Passes Insider Trading Bill, Includes Treble Damages, No Definition,
16 SE c. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 27, at 1135 (July 6, 1984).
22. See House Adopts Senate Version of Bill to Increase Insider Trading Penalties,
19841 1277
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withstanding last minute objections to the legislation by the Office
of Management and Budget, the President signed the legislation
on August 10, 1984.23
B. The Civil Penalty
Section 21(d)(2) permits a court, in an action brought by the
SEC, to impose a civil penalty of up to three times the trading
gains, or losses avoided, on traders and tippers upon finding a vio-
lation of rule 10b-5 or any other provision or rule under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act that prohibits insider trading. This penalty is
paid into the United States Treasury. The legislative history
states: "Payment of a civil penalty by any person does not extin-
guish the liability of any other person .... The Commission may,
in its discretion, seek a penalty from any or all persons covered by
this provision. '24 That is to say, if X tips Y some inside informa-
tion all6wing Y to profit by $50,000, X and Y each may have to
pay up to $150,000.
The new Act does not set guidelines for the exercise of the
court's discretion in determining the amount of the penalty. In
proposing the legislation, the SEC stated only that the amount
should be determined "in light of the facts and circumstances.
' '25
Presumably, the issue will be resolved, much the way it is resolved
in other criminal and civil fine contexts, by taking due account of
the financial resources of the defendant, the degree of culpability
and sophistication of the defendant, and related common factors.
Based on the strong legislative expression of the need for deter-
rence and the difficulty of detection of criminal infractions, it is
appropriate-at least insofar as the sophisticated trader is con-
16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 1243 (July 27, 1984).
23. See Reagan Signs Insider Trading Bill with Treble Damages, No Definition, 16
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1383 (Aug. 17, 1984). White House concerns were
noted in SEC Today Nos. 143, 145 (July 24, 26, 1984).
24. 130 CONG. REc. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement by Rep. Dingell). This
floor statement by Mr. Dingell, chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, is particularly significant in the legislative history for it offers an official explanation
and clarification of the Senate amendments in which the House acquiesced.
25. SEC Proposal, supra note 17, at 25. In a Memorandum from the SEC's Office of
the General Counsel dated April 12, 1983, and transmitted to Representative Rinaldo, the
SEC staff indicated that one example in which less than a 300% penalty might be war-
ranted is derivative liability-for example, when an employee improperly trades on a firm's
behalf. See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 44; see also HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at
8-9. For a discussion of standard-setting in administratively imposed penalties, see Diver,
The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative Agen-
cies, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1461-71 (1979).
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cerned-to treat the 300% civil penalty figure as the rule, not the
exception.1
6
The legislation applies "whenever it shall appear to the SEC
that any person has violated any provision of this title or the rules
or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while
in possession of material nonpublic information. '2 7 Therefore, a vi-
olation of any antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act,
principally rules 10b-5 and 14e-3,1s could give rise to the penalty
insofar as trading on the basis of material nonpublic information is
concerned. The new penalty, however, applies only to trading "on
or through the facilities of a national securities exchange or from
or through a broker or dealer" 9 and "not as part of a public offer-
ing by an issuer of securities."30 The SEC placed this restriction in
the law to emphasize that the Act's purpose is protecting the integ-
rity of the impersonal markets; alternative remedial mechanisms
and protections are more readily available and effective when buy-
ing or selling is face-to-face or in connection with a public offering.
Thus, the need for additional deterrence is not as compelling."
To measure profits gained or losses avoided, the court must
calculate the difference between the purchase or sale price and the
trading price within "a reasonable period after public dissemina-
tion of the nonpublic information."3 2 In arriving at this formula-
tion, the drafters specifically chose not to measure profit by the
26. Under both rules 10b-5 and 14e-3, a person may commit a violation without appre-
ciating the illegality of his actions. In the rare case in which a person did not fully under-
stand the wrongfulness of his trading, treble profits may be excessive. Typically, the illegal
trading pursued by the SEC is characterized by careful attempts at secrecy and deception,
in which case the maximum penalty is appropriate. In its proposal letter the SEC gave some
indication that the treble profits remedy was to be a presumption, reducible "in appropriate
cases." SEC Proposal, supra note 17, at 25 n.48.
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1984)).
28. The language of the statute refers to any provision of the Exchange Act; hence, a
violation of § 15(c), which prohibits certain frauds by broker-dealers, could be covered as
well.
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1984)).
30. Id.
31. See SEC Proposal, supra note 17, at 26. When a transaction is face-to-face, there
is a clear incentive on the part of the defrauded person to sue. In a public offering the strict
disclosure requirements imposed under the Securities Act presumably will prevent most
forms of abuse. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2)(B), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat.
1264 (1984) (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1984)).
32. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2)(B), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1984)).
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difference between the defendant's purchase and sale prices. 3
Thus, if an insider buys at five, watches as the stock goes up to ten
shortly after public disclosure and sells six months after disclosure
at fifteen, the gain per share is five, not ten. On the other hand, if
six months later, when the sale takes place, the price has gone back
to five, so that there is no actual profit at all, there is still a paper
profit of five on which to base the penalty. As to what constitutes a
"reasonable period," there is a good deal of case law discussing the
determination of when the information can be expected to be re-
flected in the market price.3 4 For the most widely traded issu-
ers-those having highly liquid, efficient markets-the price may
reflect the information in a matter of hours, if not minutes.35 In
addition to the size of the issuer, a court should take into account
the nature of the information. Some new data, such as increased
earnings projections or dividends, can be evaluated extremely rap-
idly; other more subjective types of disclosures may take more time
to digest intelligently. A useful presumption is the average trading
price the day after disclosure, which could then be adjusted if the
nature of the issuer, the market, or the information so requires.3 6
Another important point about the penalty is that it may be
collected in addition to any other remedies directed against the
33. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 11-12. In a 1983 case the SEC argued that
the purchase-sale differential was preferable from a deterrent standpoint. The First Circuit
rejected this view. See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983). Given the treble
measure of the new Act, courts do not have to stretch the definition of profit beyond logical
interpretation in order to achieve the deterrence goal. See Letter from SEC Chairman John
Shad to Congressman Wirth (June 29, 1983) [hereinafter cited as SEC letter of June 29,
1983], reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 29.
The new Act's formula could still result in over or under penalization. Movements in
the price of shares being traded may occur for reasons unrelated to the information in ques-
tion. For example, assume an insider might buy at 5 based on confidential data about an ore
strike. A week later, an unexpectedly favorable unrelated development in the industry
causes the stock to go up to 8. The confidential data is then made public, causing the stock
to go to 12. In essence, the profit made from the misuse of the information is 4. Nonetheless,
the profit for purposes of the penalty will be 7, for a possible penalty of $21 per share.
34. The timing issue arises with respect to the question of how soon after a public
statement an insider can trade, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 &
n.18 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), as well as what class of persons can
sue the insider and the damages they can recover in a private action, see Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1972).
35. For an empirical study of the timing issue, see Patell & Wolfson, The Intraday
Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to Earnings and Dividend Announcements, 37 J. FIN.
EcoN. 223 (1984).
36. Given the trebling mechanism, there is no reason to worry that the insider might
benefit unduly or be underpenalized from too short a "reasonable period."
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wrongdoer. 7 The SEC, therefore, could obtain both disgorgement
of profits and treble profits as a penalty-for all practical pur-
poses, a quadruple profits sanction. In the above illustration, when
the wrongful profit is five dollars per share, the insider may have
to pay five dollars as disgorgement and fifteen dollars as a penalty,
for a total of twenty dollars a share. A court should not reduce the
civil penalty simply because disgorgement also has been granted;
these remedies, according to the legislative history, are cumulative
and serve entirely different purposes.
The legislative history refers to the availability of private
rights of action against insider trading in two contexts. First, be-
cause of questions as to standing and the disgorgement measure,
participants in the hearing noted the inadequacy of the private
remedy as an effective deterrent.38 Second, some of the drafters
implicitly assumed the availability of the private action in describ-
ing the alternative remedies available to the SEC. According to the
House Report, for instance, a court might place the disgorged
funds in an escrow account to be used to compensate those harmed
by the insider trading.3 9
Logically, the measure of damages in a private action should
not be affected by the existence of a section 21(d)(2) penalty.
Elkind is a functionally sensible decision-the open-market ab-
stain or disclose requirement is simply a way of preventing unjust
enrichment, and hence the most sound remedy is disgorge-
ment-although the Elkind damage measure does beg some con-
ceptual problems. 40 The only forceful argument against disgorge-
ment has been its inadequacy as a deterrent, an argument that
substantially loses its force as a result of the Act's passage. One
would expect Elkind, therefore, to become more firmly established
as the prevailing approach.
37. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 8.
38. See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 119 (testimony of Dennis J. Block).
39. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 8; see also SEC Proposal, supra note 17, at 25.
For a case exploring the relationship, between SEC-obtained disgorgement and private
rights, see SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, [1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,424 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1983).
40. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 38-39; see also Thompson, The Measure of Re-
covery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv.
349, 391-97 (1984). Plainly, there is no basis for arguing that the 1934 Act impliedly allows




A politically sensitive issue during consideration of the penalty
provision was the degree to which courts should impose penalty
liability on persons other than actual traders or tippers. In dealing
with these questions, the drafters have touched on some important
issues that extend beyond the insider trading context.
1. Controlling Person Liability
Section 21(d)(2)(B) states that "section 20(a) of this title shall
not apply to an action brought under this paragraph."'41 Section
20(a) imposes joint and several liability on certain controlling per-
sons for damages assessed on their agents or functionaries.42 The
intent of this exemptive sentence is to assure, for example, that an
investment banking firm that employs a person who trades for his
own account based on inside information, or tips others, does not
automatically become liable as a "deep pocket" for the penalty.43
The firm may, of course, still face section 20(a) liability in an ap-
propriate SEC or private action for its employee's disgorgement
obligations, but the firm does not have to pay the penalty.
44
Subsection (B) also states that "no person shall be liable
under this paragraph solely by reason of employing another person
who is liable under this paragraph."4e This sentence is by no means
redundant. The SEC's view, endorsed by a majority of courts, is
that, quite apart from section 20(a), the common-law doctrine of
respondeat superior makes employers and other principals liable
for the acts of their employees and agents done in the course of
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2)(B), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1984)).
42. Section 20(a) makes the controlling person liable unless he "acted in good faith
and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982).
43. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 9-10; SEC letter of June 29, 1983, supra note
33, at 28-29.
44. Section 20(a) contain a good faith defense, which protects the controlling person if
he can demonstrate that he "maintained and enforced a reasonable and proper system of
supervision . . . over controlled persons so as to prevent, so far as possible, violations" of
the law. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975); see Note, Rule lOb-5-The Equivalent Scope of Liability Under Respondeat Supe-
rior and Section 20(a) - Imposing a Benefit Requirement on Apparent Authority, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1400-04 (1982). The effect of the new Act's exemption, therefore, is to
protect from the treble penalty those controlling persons whose only role in the impropriety
was a failure to supervise.
45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2)(B), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (to be codified 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1984)).
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employment and designed for the employer's benefit.4 This sen-
tence, therefore, is designed to assure that the SEC does not use
the respondeat superior theory of secondary liability to circumvent
the limitation on section 20(a).47 The addition of this sentence
raises two points. First, it represents an explicit statutory recogni-
tion of the respondeat superior theory, and should finally resolve
what had been a split between the circuits as to whether that com-
mon-law doctrine remained available.4 s Second, by focusing closely
on "employment," the statutory phrasing technically leaves open
other relationships that might give rise to common-law derivative
liability.49 For example, could a law firm be liable for a penalty
when one of its partners tips or trades? If the intent of the provi-
sion is to hold only actual tippers and traders liable for the penalty
as the legislative history indicates, then the answer should be no.
2. Principal Liability
The most interesting interpretive question under the 1984 Act
arises when an employee trades for the account of his employer
while either he or someone else in the firm possesses inside infor-
mation. Is the firm then liable? 50 Obviously, if the board of direc-
tors or senior management both possess the information and direct
or authorize an employee to trade on the company's behalf, the
company itself is the principal violator and should be liable for the
penalty.51 The result is less obvious when only a junior employee
46. E.g., Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1011 (1980); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th Cir. 1974); Note, supra
note 44, at 1387-89.
47. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 10.
48. In the Third and Ninth Circuits, courts held that § 20(a) was the exclusive source
of liability. E.g., Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton, 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Fischel, Secondary
Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80 (1981).
The House Report refers only to the majority approach. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18,
at 10 & n.18.
49. The "majority approach" cases listed supra note 46 proceed from the assumption
that the full range of common-law derivative liability is available in addition to § 20(a).
These derivative theories by no means are limited to the employment relationship. See SEA-
vEY, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (1934).
50. In such a vicarious liability situation, the firm is the purchaser or seller. Thus, if
knowledge of the information is imputed to the firm, as it normally will be, the firm would
be trading "while in possession of" the material information.
51. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 10-11. In such an obvious case company or
firm liability would be based on something more than failure to supervise. In determining
whether to impose criminal liability on a firm for the acts of its employees, assessing the
level of senior management involvement may be proper. See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official
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knows the information-for example, a trader in a firm's arbitrage
department who has received a tip about an impending tender of-
fer and trades on the firm's behalf. Early in the legislative history,
the SEC indicated that it could seek a penalty against the firm in
such an instance, although the circumstances might be such that a
penalty substantially less than treble profits would be appropri-
ate.52 Other portions of the legislative history suggest that impos-
ing firm liability based on a junior employee's actions may be the
proper approach. For example, the legislative history expresses the
need to prevent multiservice firms from facing penalty liability
when one branch of the firm possesses material nonpublic informa-
tion about a company and, without any communication, another
branch buys or sells stock of the company for the firm's ac-
count-the "Chinese Wall" problem.53 The Senate version of the
bill had a statutory exemption from secondary liability for mul-
tiservice broker-dealers in such instances. The exemption was
dropped at the last minute, but only on the expectation that the
SEC would act to provide protection for such firms administra-
tively, presumably through rulemaking similar to that found in
rule 14e-3."4 If a firm is not liable unless one or more members of
the senior management both know the information and direct or
authorize the trading, then the "Chinese Wall" problem would
rarely, if ever, arise. Continuing concern over this issue, therefore,
suggests that at least some of the drafters believed that a firm
could face liability even though its upper level management was
not simultaneously aware of the information and involved in the
trade.
Draft 1962). But see St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir.
1955).
52. See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 44. This assertion was based on a version of
the bill that did not contain exemptive language for "secondary" participants. In its June
29, 1983, letter supporting modification of the bill to exempt nontipper-traders, the SEC
stated that "where a person neither shares in the illicit profits of the inside trader nor tips
such a person, the rationale of the bill does not apply," indicating that the SEC still viewed
the firm as potentially liable when the trading was for its account. HousE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 28-29 (emphasis added).
53. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 11. A common example of the problem oc-
curs when a firm's investment banking branch possesses the material information and the
firm's trading department coincidentally trades that company's stock.
54. 130 CONG. REC. S8913-14 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. D'Amato). The
SEC had urged this rulemaking approach. See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 44-45.
Rule 14e-3(b) exempts firms from liability to the extent they implement reasonable proce-
dures to prevent the misuse of nonpublic tender offer related information. Section
21(d)(2)(A) gives the SEC rulemaking authority to "exempt from the provisions of this par-
agraph any class of persons or transactions."
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Other parts of the legislative history, however, indicate that
firm liability should not be predicated on a junior employee's un-
guided actions. In describing the situations in which corporate lia-
bility is appropriate, the House Report implies that direction by
senior management is crucial to liability.55 Moreover, one of the
bill's sponsors clearly stated that "[i]f an investment adviser to an
investment company, without the company's knowledge or ap-
proval, directs trades on behalf of the investment company while
in possession o'f material nonpublic information, the investment
company and consequently its shareholders should not be subject
to the triple penalty."5 By analogy, neither should the employer
firm's shareholders, and on balance, this is the more sensible ap-
proach. The only deterrence-type justification for imposing penalty
liability on a firm is that it may cause employers to take stronger
steps to assure that their junior level employees do not trade on its
behalf while possessing confidential information. While this watch-
fulness might be helpful, the legislative history shows no desire to
extend liability to that level of "fault." To the contrary, the new
Act itself specifically exempts employer liability based simply on
failure to supervise.57 The only difference is that the firm has bene-
fited from the illegality, but this is remedied by making the firm
disgorge the improper profits.5 8 From a policy perspective, a firm
should face liability for treble profits only if some or all of its sen-
ior management knew of the inside information and either caused
or knowingly permitted the trade to take place for its own account.
3. Aiding and Abetting
The first sentence of section 21(d)(2)(B) states that no person
shall be subject to civil penalty "solely because that person aided
and abetted a transaction covered by such paragraph in a manner
other than by communicating material nonpublic information.'"59
The intent of this sentence is clearly to assure that only tippers
55. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 10-11.
56. 130 CONG. REC. H7758 (July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
57. See supra note 44.
58. The junior-level employee is the primary wrongdoer and should be subject to pen-
alty-his conduct is the functional equivalent of a tip. He could be found to be a primary
violator or an aider and abettor of the firm's violation. In the latter characterization, how-
ever, the junior-level employee will be liable for the penalty only if his conduct included
communication of information. See text accompanying note 59. To the extent that common-
law imputation of knowledge is deemed "communication," that standard would be met.
59. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2)(B), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1984)).
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and traders, and not such persons as brokers who execute the un-
lawful trades, are subject to the penalty. 0 The drafters expressed
the view that other remedies, particularly administrative proceed-
ings under section 15(b), provide sufficient deterrence to broker
misconduct." Nonetheless, in explaining this exemption, the
House Report gratuitously noted that "[tihe Committee endorses
the judicial application of the concept of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity to achieve the remedial purposes of the securities laws," and
cited two Second Circuit cases with approval.2 Plaintiffs certainly
will try to use this language to support the expansive use of aiding




The foregoing discussion shows that the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act itself, while raising some interesting interpretive issues, is
not difficult to understand. More intriguing is the Act's spillover
effect on the issue of what constitutes unlawful trading. As was
observed earlier, the Act is to some extent a ratification of current
insider trading doctrine. This is not to say that each and every
previously decided case is approved of, but rather that the bill's
drafters believed that the prevailing law in general provides an ac-
ceptable structure to carry out the objective of deterring abusive
trading. Again, Congress would not have effectively quadrupled the
penalties for insider trading had they been wholly dissatisfied with
the underlying approach to the imposition of liability.
As submitted, the SEC draft bill carefully avoided defining in-
sider trading. In a subsequent letter to House subcommittee Chair-
man Wirth, the Commission said that "[t]he flexibility which is
gained by basing the imposition of the penalty on existing case law
avoids the problems of freezing into law either a definition which is
60. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 10; see House Hearings, supra note 18, at 44, 47-
49 (SEC letter and testimony).
61. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 28 (SEC letter).
62. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 10 n.17, (citing SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020,
1028 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978)). Both of these cases represent a
flexible, nonrestrictive approach to aiding and abetting liability.
63. Whether the Act will have its desired deterrent effect is an entirely separate ques-
tion. Arguably, a step-up in criminal enforcement satisfactorily creates a substantial penalty
threat; those who continue to trade unlawfully presumably believe that they will not be
caught and are not terribly concerned with any threat.
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too broad, or too narrow to deal with newly emerging issues. '64
The House Report concurred, stating that the law "is suffi-
ciently well-developed at this time to provide adequate guidance"
and that:
[t]he legal principles governing the majority of insider trading cases are well-
established and widely-known.... Recent action by the Commission and the
courts has clarified the legal principles governing the smaller number of cases
that involve trading on information that originates from sources other than
the company-for example, information about a future tender offer.65
On the Senate side, subcommittee Chairman D'Amato was not
as convinced. In the course of the April 1984 hearings, he ex-
pressed the view that certain aspects of liability were highly uncer-
tain and could result in a variety of abusive practices remaining
unpunished. Senator D'Amato drafted a provision that would pe-
nalize a trader "if he employs the [material nonpublic] information
in violation of his own fiduciary or contractual obligations, or if to
his knowledge the information is imparted to him in violation of
the fiduciary or contractual obligations of the person imparting
such information to him. '6 6 This proposal provoked a substantial
amount of controversy, and many influential persons submitted al-
ternative proposals,67 leading the SEC's general counsel to com-
ment that drafting a substantive prohibition was becoming one of
Washington's leading "cottage industries. '68 Recognizing that the
inability to agree on either the need for a specific prohibition or
how it should be drafted was the single remaining roadblock to the
bill's passage, Senator D'Amato dropped the effort in June in order
to assure prompt enactment.
6 9
B. The Basic Prohibition: Insiders
The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that the draft-
ers accepted the fiduciary duty basis for the obligation to abstain
or disclose, established in Chiarella and reaffirmed in Dirks, as the
starting point for analysis. In other words, a person must refrain
from trading on inside information if he owes a fiduciary duty of
64. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32. See generally Junewicz, Insider Trading Act
Is Needed, but Without Defining the Term, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 30, 1984, at 24, col. 3.
65. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 13 & n.20.
66. See Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 32-35.
67. Id. at 8-10.
68. Id. at 37. Both the House and Senate hearings included fiduciary liability propos-
als, the most significant of which was that of Milton Freeman. See Freeman, The Insider
Trading Sanctions Bill-A Neglected Opportunity, 4 PACE L. REV. 221 (1984).
69. 130 CONG. REC. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
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disclosure to the class of marketplace traders who are disadvan-
taged by not knowing those facts.70 A person owes a fiduciary duty
to investors in the securities of the issuer if he is a fiduciary of the
issuer. Corporate directors, officers, and employees are the most
obvious class of corporate fiduciaries, but as the Dirks case points
out, there is a category of "temporary" insiders that includes attor-
neys, accountants, underwriters, and other agents, who owe com-
mon-law fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care to the issuer dur-
ing the course of the relationship."'
The post-Chiarella case that tests the outer limits of the con-
cept of fiduciary liability is SEC v. Lund.72 In Lund the district
court held that the defendant became a "temporary insider" of the
issuer because the issuer's president, who was the defendant's
friend and long time business associate, called the defendant, in-
formed him of a lucrative joint venture that the issuer was plan-
ning, and asked the defendant if his company might be interested
in a capital investment in the project. No corporate investment
was made, but the defendant did purchase shares of the issuer on
the basis of the disclosed information. The court held that the de-
fendant became a temporary insider because the venture informa-
tion had been made available to him "solely for corporate pur-
poses," with the implication that it was to be kept confidential. 3
The Lund decision is largely inconsistent with the recent
Dirks case. In Dirks, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the no-
tion that fiduciary responsibility can arise simply from the receipt
of confidential information, absent either some manifestation of
assent by the outsider to some fiduciary obligations or participa-
tion in a breach of fiduciary duty creating tippee status. 4 Neither
assent nor breach was present in Lund.7 5 Though well-intended,
70. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 18-24; see also Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries and
Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. RE-v. 341 (1982); Farley, A Current Look at the Law of
Insider Trading, 39 Bus. LAw. 1771 (1984); Wang, Recent Developments in the Federal
Law Regulating Stock Market Insider Trading, 6 CORP. L. REv. 291 (1983). A useful state-
ment of the post-Dirks law of insider trading is the Report of the Task Force on Regulation
of Insider Trading, submitted to the American Bar Association's Federal Securities Law
Committee (discussion draft, Oct. 30, 1984).
71. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983); see also Langevoort, supra note 7,
at 20-21 (examples of situations in which agents would be "temporary" insiders).
72. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
73. Id. at 1403.
74. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261.
75. In the words of the Dirks Court, not only must there be an expectation of confi-
dentiality, but "the relationship at least must imply such a duty." 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
The outsider must manifest a willingness to act on the corporation's behalf rather than in
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Lund's fiduciary duty holding is essentially contrary to a 1980 Sec-
ond Circuit state law decision, Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,76
a case cited with apparent approval in Dirks.77
The above criticism notwithstanding, Lund is one of two cases
cited explicitly in the House Report to support its conclusion that
the current law is adequate to deal with basic "outsider trading"
abuses. 78 There is no real indication that the drafters of the report
were aware of the tenuous temporary fiduciary relationship basis
for Lund. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the Lund citation gives
some support to the argument of some of the Act's drafters that
fiduciary responsibility should in some cases "run with the infor-
mation." This use of Lund is a good illustration of a basic theme in
the legislative history. While technically accepting the highly re-
strictive Chiarella-Dirks framework, the drafters' approach in dis-
cussing the substantive issues of liability seemingly eschews con-
ceptualism-the legislative objective is to come down hard on any
trading, as in Lund, that is inconsistent with basic notions of hon-
esty and fair play. More important is deterring those who profit
from the "theft" of information, not establishing a neat scheme for
explaining coherently why such thefts violate the securities laws.
One gets the sense that had the present Congress gone forward
with a comprehensive definition of unlawful trading, it would not
have chosen to follow the Supreme Court's restrictive approach
that forces the sort of manipulation found in Lund.
C. "While in Possession of"
The language and legislative history of the Act appear to clar-
ify one substantive issue that has arisen from time to time over the
last few years. Section 21(d)(2) states that the civil penalty can be
imposed on those who violate a rule or statutory provision barring
trading "while in possession of" material nonpublic information.79
pursuit of his own interests, at least with respect to the particular information.
76. 623 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that participation in a confidential
merger negotiation and receipt of sensitive information through those negotiations did not
create a fiduciary obligation in the prospective merger partner).
77. See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265 n.22; see also Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics
Fund, 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding no breach of fiduciary duty when outsiders had
"constructive knowledge" of the information).
78. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 13 n.20. The citation in the report is to a prelimi-
nary decision in the case, SEC v. Lund, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 98,428 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 22, 1982), which was followed in the later opinion.
79. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, § 2
(1984) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. 1984)).
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Commentators have questioned whether liability exists only when
it can be shown that the information was the reason for the trading
or whether it might be a defense if the insider can show that he
would have traded anyway, with or without the information. 0 The
1984 Act's new statutory language suggests that the answer is no,
that possession of the information, not motivation, is controlling.
Further, a discussion in the course of the House hearings suggests
that the drafters were aware of precisely what they were doing.8 1
D. Trading in Options
One substantive change that the Act explicitly creates is found
in new section 20(d), which makes it unlawful to trade in options
and other derivative instruments while in possession of material
nonpublic information, whenever trading the underlying security
would be unlawful. While prior to the 1984 Act, the issue was not
totally resolved, a number of courts had held that because an op-
tion holder is not owed any fiduciary obligation by the corporation
or its insiders per se,82 the abstain or disclose rule is inapplicable
to options trading.8 3 This finding, of course, potentially allowed a
major loophole in the law, for profits can be made as easily trading
in options as in stocks.8 4 Legislative revision was thus sensible,
85
although revision in the 1984 Act raises the same Chiarella-Dirks
anomaly noted above. If we assume, as courts have, that option
holders are not beneficiaries of any disclosure obligation as a mat-
ter of the law of fiduciary duty, the statutory change is effectively a
statement that the disclosure obligation should exist, in some cases
at least, absent any preexisting fiduciary duty. This extension is
contrary to the Chiarella-Dirks rule that a preexisting duty is nec-
essary, showing once again that while the drafters were prepared to
80. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 43-44.
81. House Hearings, supra note 18, at 48-49; see Stevenson, supra note 1, at 18, col. 4.
82. Because option holders own only a right to purchase an interest in a company, no
fiduciary relationship between the company and the option holder exists prior to exercise of
the option.
83. See Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 150 (1983); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
84. The options loophole is closed somewhat by an expansive use of the misappropria-
tion theory, see infra notes 99-120 and accompanying text, or by rule 14e-3, which makes it
a fraudulent act under section 14(c) of the Securities Exchange Act to trade while in posses-
sion of material nonpublic information concerning a tender offer. See O'Connor & Assocs. v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. at 1187-1193.
85. See 130 CONG. REc. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell);
130 CONG. REc. S8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
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recognize and ratify the Supreme Court's approach in construing
current law, they believed that from a policy standpoint it can re-
sult in too narrow a prohibition.
E. Tippers and Tippees
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court was forced to explain why, if
a preexisting fiduciary relationship is necessary to invoke the ab-
stain or disclose rule, tippees could ever be liable under that the-
ory. The Court explained by stating that "[t]he tippee's obligation
has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the
fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty. '8 6 Apparently then,
a breach of fidicuiary duty by an insider is a necessary precondi-
tion to tippee liability.
The Dirks case further explored this issue. In Dirks, an invest-
ment analyst was visited by two corporate insiders of a company
that was fraudulently concealing its true condition. The insiders
wanted the analyst to help them expose the misconduct. He did,
but not before tipping his clients to sell their shares in that com-
pany. The Court's decision rigorously adhered to the fiduciary duty
approach, holding that since the insiders had breached no duty to
the company in trying to expose the fraud, the analyst had no de-
rivative duty to disclose the information to other investors.8 7 The
fact that the analyst's clients profited vis-a-vis the rest of the mar-
ket from access to information directly from inside the company
was not enough. Whether or not one agrees with this holding, it
was predictable in light of the Court's Chiarella construct. What is
more significant about the decision is that the Court, going beyond
the missing duty element and discussing extensively the scienter
issue for tippee liability, added a new element to the law. Not only
must there now be proof of a breach of fiduciary duty by the in-
sider, but there also must be a showing that the tippee "knew or
should have known of the breach," and to establish this element,
the plaintiff must prove that the tippee was on notice that the in-
sider would benefit personally from the tip.8
86. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12; see Langevoort, supra note 7, at 25, 28-31.
Strangely, new § 21(d)(2)(B) seems to indicate that tipping is unlawful because it aids and
abets the trading-reversing the Court's emphasis.
87. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263-64.
88. Id. at 3265-66. On this point, the Court cited Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1978).
For discussions of Dirks, see Phillips, Insider Trading Liability After Dirks, 16 REV. SEC.
REG. 841 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 286 (1983); Note,
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This benefit requirement is a curious and largely unnecessary
wrinkle; if there is one clear understanding in the common law of
fiduciary responsibility, it is that an intent to benefit is not a nec-
essary element. Moreover, the Court's approach to what consti-
tutes a benefit is so broad that it makes the limitation extremely
subjective and largely illusory. For example, the Court suggested
that a tip designed to enhance the insider's reputation would be
one for personal benefit."9 More surprisingly, the Court indicated
that a "gift" of confidential information would violate the rule be-
cause it resembles "trading by the insider himself followed by a
gift of the profits to the recipient." 90 To define personal benefit to
include the warm glow arising from "charitable" giving reduces the
concept to an absurdity.91
The personal benefit prong developed in Dirks has had its ef-
fect. In SEC v. Switzer,92 a corporate insider, attending a track
meet, mentioned to his wife that there might be a liquidation of
his company. This remark was "inadvertently overheard" by Uni-
versity of Oklahoma football coach Barry Switzer, who thereupon
bought shares of the company. The district court concluded: first,
that the insider breached no duty in mentioning the information to
his wife; and second, that even had there been a breach, it was not
manifestly for an improper purpose.9 3 The first of these conclu-
sions is not obvious-talking freely about a highly sensitive corpo-
rate matter at a track meet certainly can be a violation of the duty
of care owed by a fiduciary. Still, the result is consistent with the
strict logic of Chiarella and Dirks, for it is difficult to see that
Switzer was actually a participant or co-venturer in the breach. Us-
ing this approach, the courts are saying that there is nothing wrong
Rule 10b-5 and the Fiduciary Doctrine: Dirks v. SEC, 4 J. L. & COMM. 127 (1984); Note,
Securities: Dirks v. SEC-When Insiders Talk, Should You Listen?, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 194
(1984); Comment, Dirks v. SEC: New Guidelines for Tippee Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 4
PACE L. REv. 631 (1984).
89. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
90. Id.
91. This amorphous view of benefit is particularly ironic insofar as the Court's purpose
in establishing the personal benefit requirement is to restrict liability to those instances in
which the tippee can readily ascertain the breach.
92. [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,589 (W.D. Okla., June 29,
1984).
93. Id. at 1 99,020. For other cases dealing with the benefit requirement, see State
Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,656
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 27, 1984); In re Wentz, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 83,629, at
86,868-69 (Admin. Proc., May 15, 1984).
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with a true outsider "getting lucky." '94
Dirks was decided just before the House Committee acted on
the insider trading legislation, and caused the committee some
concern. The committee determined, however, that "if the Dirks
decision is properly and narrowly construed by the courts, the
SEC's insider trading program will not be adversely affected."95
The House Committee did request the SEC to report periodically
with an analysis of the case's effect. This legislative history should
encourage courts to find that the benefit test presumptively is met
whenever information is conveyed knowingly to an outsider with-
out apparent business justification.
Even a narrow construction of the Dirks approach leaves open
one important problem. Imagine that a financial analyst or news-
paper reporter has arranged a meeting with a corporate executive
to discuss various investment related matters. During the conver-
sation, the executive releases some previously confidential informa-
tion, in an effort to publicize it. May the analyst or reporter trade
prior to "effective dissemination"? Following Dirks strictly, there
was no apparent fiduciary breach by the executive because the re-
lease of the information was for a valid business purpose. The an-
swer, however, is not so clear. Conceivably, in the analyst case at
least, a court might find it improper for the executive to have dis-
seminated the information "selectively," rather than at a press
conference, thereby favoring one group of shareholders, through
their agent, over others.9 ' This improper disclosure would satisfy
the first prong of the Chiarella-Dirks test by establishing a breach
of fiduciary duty. If the selective disclosure appears to have been
for the executive's reputational or other benefit, the second prong
of the test would be met as well. Such a holding would require an
insider to act with loyalty and care not only with respect to the
reasons for communicating sensitive information but in the
94. Insofar as the Act's legislative history expresses an intention to punish the "theft"
of information, or situations of dishonesty or unfair dealing, the Switzer holding is judicially
consistent. Certainly, allowing someone like Switzer to profit from his good fortune hardly
will undermine investor confidence in the stock market.
95. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 14-15.
96. For the difficulties in applying Dirks in an investment analyst case, see In re
Wentz, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,629 (Admin. Proc., May 15,
1984). In the case of a reporter, the misappropriation theory discussed below would provide
an alternative method for imposing liability. See infra text accompanying notes 99-120.
Similarly, under broad acceptance of the theory established in Lund, a court might consider
the analyst a "temporary insider" to the extent that he received the information for a lim-
ited purpose. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. Such an application of the
Lund case merely highlights the conceptual difficulty of its theory.
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method of communication as well. One should note, however, a
statement by the House drafters that "[w]e anticipate that the
courts. . . will be mindful of the necessity, in light of the substan-
tial penalties herein imposed, to avoid unduly inhibiting traders
from generating and acting upon valid research information of the
sort upon which efficient markets necessarily depend. ' 97 Given the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of distinguishing clearly between ba-
sic research efforts and eliciting useful information," courts may
be tempted to treat this legislative language as providing a safe
harbor for analysts. Such a restrictive approach would be unfortu-
nate, for one hardly can imagine a more vivid example of "unfair
play" in the marketplace than the analyst/reporter example given
above.
F. Misappropriation
One of the more indirectly significant aspects of the Chiarella
decision was its failure to reject99, and concurring comments from
Justice Stevens seemingly in support of'00, the "misappropriation"
theory of insider trading liability. The misappropriation theory,
which holds that converting confidential information for personal
trading gain operates as a fraud on the source of the informa-
tion-usually the trader's employer-' 10 was adopted quickly by
the SEC as part of its enforcement program, 102 and received a
97. 130 CONG. REc. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
98. This point was first made in Dirks. See 103 S. Ct. at 3263 nn.17-18. The Court
seems to have overstated this point; taken to its logical conclusion, any investment analyst
would be free to tip or trade. Cf. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated on other grounds sub nom., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) (the first
case to develop the "co-venturer" theory of tippee liability ultimately adopted in Chiarella);
Langevoort, supra note 7, at 29 & nn.115-17; see also SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d
8 (2d Cir. 1977). For a case picking up on the Court's point, see Levinson v. Basic Inc.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,801, at 90,045-46 (N.D. Ohio, Aug. 3, 1984); for a discussion
of the investment analyst problem generally, see Comment, An Examination of Investment
Analyst Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1984 ARIz. ST. L.J. 129.
99. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236-37.
100. Id. at 237-38.
101. The misappropriation theory is in distinct contrast to the rationale suggested by
Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240-43. Burger's theory is that a
person who misappropriates information comes under a duty to disclose the information to
anyone with whom he trades. This theory has not received affirmative judicial recognition.
See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280
(1984).
102. No person will have a private right to sue under the misappropriation theory
because, while the source of the information is deceived, it is not a purchaser or seller of the
securities and has no standing to sue. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d at 16; see
also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975).
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prompt judicial stamp of approval by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Newman. 03 The misappropriation theory has become the
primary vehicle for reaching nontraditional trading cases, those
that are neither clear cut insider or tippee cases, nor proscribed
explicitly by rule 14e-3.
There are two serious conceptual problems with this theory,
both concerning consistency with the Supreme Court's 1977 deci-
sion in Santa Fe Industries v. Green.10 4 The lesser difficulty is
figuring out how merely using confidential information as the basis
for trading is actually deceptive, rather than merely a breach of
fiduciary duty-a requirement established by Santa Fe. 0 5 The
more substantial problem is determining how a doctrine whose
functional effect is to safeguard an employer's "confidentiality" in-
terest fits within the "zone of interests" of the securities laws.
The legislative history of the 1984 Act evidences that the
drafters were quite familiar with the misappropriation theory. The
House Report cited Newman, for example, in support of its conclu-
sion that the current law deals adequately with basic outsider trad-
ing abuses.'0 6 The SEC repeatedly espoused the theory for illustra-
tive purposes in its statements and in House testimony for
enhanced enforcement powers.107 The Senate gave the misappro-
priation theory even more detailed consideration. Sena-
tor D'Amato raised questions about the viability of the misappro-
priation approach under current law, and justified his effort to
include a definition of unlawful trading, which. in many respects
would simply have been a codification of the theory, by arguing the
need to ensure that misappropriators are punished.'08 The SEC
agreed that the theory was not solid law absent affirmative en-
dorsement by the Supreme Court, but nonetheless resisted the ef-
fort to define unlawful trading, feeling "not dissatisfied," at least,
with the use of the theory. 09 Although Senator D'Amato's decision
to drop the definition was an attempt to expedite passage of the
legislation, there is no evidence that he was convinced that a deft-
103. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); see also SEC v. Materia, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 91,681 (2d Cir. Oct. 1, 1984).
104. 430 U.S. 462 (1977); see Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Profes-
sionals, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1247, 1286-87 (1983); Langevoort, supra note 7, at 45-49.
105. 430 U.S. at 473-74.
106. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 13 n.20.
107. See SEC Proposal, supra note 17, at 22 n.34; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32
(SEC letter); House Hearings, supra note 17, at 36.
108. Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 32-33.
109. Id. at 33.
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nition would either be unwise or unnecessary, his floor statement
referred in approving terms to the misappropriation approach.110
Unquestionably, the legislative history reflects a congressional
endorsement of the misappropriation theory, whatever its doctrinal
uncertainty. There is repeated evidence from both sides of Con-
gress that the principal drafters considered trading on "stolen" in-
formation an abuse that ought to be remedied."' Had there been a
consensus that the current law does not reach such trading, clearly
Congress would have attempted to cure the defect. Their failure to
recognize a pressing need for a new definition of unlawful trading
strongly suggests a "congressional intent" in favor of the misappro-
priation theory's validity as a general matter.
Simply recognizing the congressional ratification of the misap-
propriation theory, however, does not provide specific guidance for
its application. First, what constitutes a "misappropriation"?
Under Santa Fe, there must be deception for a cause of action
under section 10(b). 1 2 In Newman, there was plain evidence of an
active scheme by defendants to prevent detection-among other
things, the use of secret foreign bank accounts. The court found
this scheme, coupled with the harm the defendants caused by "sul-
lying the reputations" of their investment bank employers' 13 suffi-
cient to establish fraud within the meaning of rule 10b-5. 14 Subse-
quent misappropriation cases have not been even that analytical,
imposing liability for little more than trading on information when
it seems clear that the trader's employer or client would object to
such use." 5 This type of "deception," of course, is close to a simple
breach of fiduciary duty. Nonetheless, the Act's legislative history
evidences that the latter situation is precisely what the drafters
believed should be covered by the insider trading laws, the "theft"
of information. One suspects that this may be one more example of
110. 130 CONG. REC. S8912 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) ("I
recognize the difficulties attendant to the codification of a definition applicable to the di-
verse circumstances governed by existing case low [sic], including. . . the respective rights
of. . . sources of misappropriated information.")
111. See Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 1 (Senator D'Amato stating insider trad-
ers are "thieves.").
112. 430 U.S. at 473-74.
113. This is a strange sort of harm, for it only occurs if the scheme is discovered.
114. Newman, 664 F.2d at 14-16. Of course proof of harm does not, in and of itself,
distinguish deception from breach of duty.
115. See SEC v. Materia, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,681 (2d
Cir. Oct. 1, 1984); SEC v. Musella, [1983-84] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,637 (S.D.N.Y.,
Jan. 14, 1984). Musella is also interesting because it imports the Dirks "benefit" test to the
misappropriation context.
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a congressional judgment that calls into question the wisdom of
the Supreme Court's strict literalism.
The second conceptual issue is how can the breach of an em-
ployer's confidentiality interest be considered "in connection with
the purchase or sale" of securities.116 From a standpoint of concep-
tual neatness, a statutory provision that prohibits fraud and decep-
tion in connection with a purchase or sale of securities should re-
quire a showing that the person allegedly defrauded was engaged
in some investment related activity in order to establish liability.
117
In Newman, there was a reasonable connection between the inter-
ests of defendants' employers and their clients, who needed confi-
dentiality in order to assure the success of their merger related
stock purchase program, and the objectives of the securities laws.
The court's reasoning, however, was far broader, essentially finding
that the "in connection with" requirement was satisfied by defen-
dants' own trading, and thus moving the focus completely away
from the defrauded parties' interests.11 Once this step is taken a
court may give a wide scope to the misappropriation theory, for by
definition there always will be trading by the defendant. This doc-
trinal invention formed the basis of the recent action against a
Wall Street Journal reporter, who purportedly joined with some
associates in a scheme of trading based on prepublication informa-
tion in the Journal's "Heard on the Street" column. The SEC's
complaint alleged that the reporter misappropriated this informa-
tion "for his own direct and indirect personal benefit in breach of a
duty to the Journal." 1 9 If one were to ask the Journal why it felt
aggrieved by the reporter's actions, it likely would respond that its
journalistic integrity, largely a reputational interest, was
threatened. An injury to reputation is harm, of course, but is it
really the kind of harm the securities laws were designed to protect
against?
The short response to all these conceptual difficulties is that
the misappropriation theory may be an ill-fitting invention, but
the result it achieves-impo-sing a measure of fair play in the mar-
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
117. See Langevoort, supra note 104, at 1277-78, 1287.
118. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17-19.
119. SEC v. Brant, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,483 (May 17,
1984) (litigation release). Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted the reporter for his
actions, which has caused some media groups to question whether the prosecution may
threaten first amendment interests. See Ex-Reporter Indicted for Insider Trades; Novel




kets that was lost in the doctrinal rigidity of Chiarella's abstain or
disclose approach-accords with the investor confidence building
intent of the securities laws generally. To the drafters of the Act,
this goal seemed far more important than conceptual consistency.
Indeed, the Journal case was cited a number of times in the legis-




The legislative history of the Act shows that its principal
drafters regarded those who trade on material confidential infor-
mation as "thieves," deserving substantial penalties. The adoption
of the Act is an expression that the existing laws should be used
aggressively to curb the misuse of information. Unfortunately, such
a result-oriented direction fits uncomfortably within the confining
conceptual structure for rule 10b-5 built in recent years by the Su-
preme Court. Lower courts therefore must flesh out the law of in-
sider trading based on inconsistent mandates, which will make the
future path of the law both unpredictable and interesting.
120. See 130 CONG. REC. H7757 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell);
Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 2, 37.
Besides approving of the misappropriation theory, the legislative history also reflects an
endorsement of rule 14e-3. Rule 14e-3, upheld by a district court in O'Connor v. Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds & Co., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1189-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), is not without some ques-
tion concerning its validity. See Poser, Misuse of Confidential Information Concerning a
Tender Offer as a Securities Fraud, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1265, 1285-86 (1983); Note, Trad-
ing on Material Nonpublic Information Under Rule 14e-3, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 539
(1981). Plainly, the drafters were supportive of the rule, assuming its validity as a basis for
their belief that the current law is largely adequate to reach most abuses. See HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 18, at 13 n.20.
1298 [Vol. 37:1273
